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POLICE-GENERATED DIGITAL VIDEO: FIVE 
KEY QUESTIONS, MULTIPLE AUDIENCES, 
AND A RANGE OF ANSWERS* 
RICHARD E. MYERS II** 
INTRODUCTION 
Police-generated digital video is being created at an ever-
accelerating pace as technology makes camera systems lighter, 
cheaper, faster, and more accessible. Video systems have expanded 
from fixed-site cameras, to dashboard-mounted cameras, to body-
worn cameras, to aerial-drone-mounted cameras. Any well-crafted 
policy regarding digital video must have calibrated answers to five 
key questions that arise as we consider the life cycle of the video: 
How will we handle (1) creation, (2) storage, (3) access, (4) redaction, 
and (5) use of the digital video created by these camera systems? In 
this Essay, I suggest that there are multiple potential audiences for 
this digital video, and each audience can be predicted to draw 
different balances in answering the five framing questions. These 
potential audiences include police management, police officers, police 
unions, criminal and civil courts, the media, civil rights advocates, civil 
libertarians, defendants, defense counsel, prosecutors, victims, and 
local governments. Their responses are likely different because each 
audience might give a slightly different answer to the meta-question: 
Why do we create this video in the first place? 
In this overview Essay for our Symposium, I briefly consider the 
five phases of the police-generated digital video life-cycle and some of 
the issues that might arise in each phase.1 Given the tradeoffs 
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 1. See LINDSAY J. MILLER, JESSICA TOLIVER & POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, 
IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM v (2014), 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing
%20a%20body-worn%20camera%20program.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAK6-A46X] 
(“[D]epartments must anticipate a number of difficult questions—questions with no easy 
answers because they involve a careful balancing of competing legitimate interests, such as 
the public’s interest in seeing body-worn camera footage versus the interests of crime 
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inherent in public policy, I propose no correct answers. Instead, I 
suggest that having all of the interested voices at the table when these 
questions are translated into policy will lead to a wide range of 
different choices that reflect the values and compromises appropriate 
for the polity that makes them.2 Other articles in this Symposium 
Issue explore specific questions in greater depth. 
I. CREATION 
The digital video life cycle starts with creation. Some of the ways 
cameras may be deployed are familiar. Cameras have long been 
mounted in a wide range of fixed sites, and private business led the 
way with security cameras. We expect to be filmed when we enter the 
bank or when we enter and leave convenience stores, so the camera’s 
presence is no surprise.3 Police-owned and -operated fixed-site 
cameras have also proliferated and appear in places such as subway 
platforms, street corners in high crime neighborhoods, and other 
public venues.4 In some cities, such as London or New York, citizens 
understand that the network of cameras covers the majority of public 
spaces.5 Another familiar site for police camera deployment is vehicle 
dashboards. The dashcam has been in wide deployment since the 
1980s,6 and has made the transition from film to digital video 
recordings.7 
As cameras have transitioned from videotape to digital media, 
and the devices have shrunk, it has become technologically and 
financially feasible to mount the cameras on the police officers’ 
 
victims who would prefer not to have their images disseminated to the world. One of the 
most significant questions departments will face is how to identify which types of 
encounters with members of the community officers should record. This decision will have 
important consequences in terms of privacy, transparency, and police-community 
relationships.”). 
 2. See infra Part V. 
 3. See LIBERTY & SEC. COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR 
PUBLIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE TO PROTECTING COMMUNITIES AND 
PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES 3 (2007). 
 4. Will Doig, New Yorkers Call for More Surveillance Cameras, NEXT CITY (June 14, 
2017), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/new-york-surveillance-cameras-police-safety 
[http://perma.cc/G4LP-DQXN]. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Darius Stitilis & Marius Laurinaitis, Legal Regulation of the Use of Dashboard 
Cameras: Aspects of Privacy Protection, 32 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 316, 317 
(2016). 
 7. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN POLICING: RESEARCH AND BEST PRACTICES 
FROM THE IACP STUDY ON IN-CAR CAMERAS 5–6 (2005). 
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bodies.8 Police departments have transitioned from dash-cams to 
badge-cams, hat-cams, or cameras on the rim of specialized glasses.9 
In October 2017 the London Metropolitan Police Department 
announced that it was deploying 22,000 body cameras—believed to be 
the largest single rollout ever.10 Other scholars have examined the 
effect of choices on where and how the cameras are mounted and the 
extent to which they accurately capture or distort the experience of 
the officer on the ground.11 But there is no question that the move to 
the officer’s body has dramatically expanded the spaces where 
citizens can now expect to encounter the unblinking digital eye. Police 
officers enter private spaces daily—with and without permission—and 
with these new cameras the privacy interests of citizens are clearly 
implicated in new ways. Police officers routinely encounter people 
during some of the worst times of their lives—when they are terrified, 
angry, injured, intoxicated, or vulnerable. Cameras are now walking 
into people’s living rooms, bedrooms, bathrooms, offices, and medical 
facilities.12 Officers can now review, at their leisure, video captured 
 
 8. For example, in 2016 London took steps toward deploying 22,000 body-worn 
cameras in all thirty-two boroughs of the city. Press Release, Metro. Police, Rollout of 
Body Worn Cameras (Oct. 17, 2016), http://news.met.police.uk/news/rollout-of-body-worn
-cameras-191380 [https://perma.cc/7LEH-JE92] (“London Mayor Sadiq Khan, said: ‘Body 
Worn Video is a huge step forward in bringing our capital’s police force into the 21st 
century and encouraging trust and confidence in community policing. This technology is 
already helping drive down complaints against officers and making them more 
accountable, as well as helping to gather better evidence for swifter justice. As we roll 
them out across London, these cameras will make a real difference to officers, as they 
continue their great work on the frontline fighting crime and keeping our city safe.’”). 
 9. Randall Stross, Wearing a Badge, and a Video Camera, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/business/wearable-video-cameras-for-police-officers.html 
[http://perma.cc/Z49W-TCA2 (dark archive)]. 
 10. Press Release, Metro. Police, supra note 8. 
 11. See Mary D. Fan, Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police Body Camera 
Videos, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1658–68 (2018); Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn 
Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1399–1413 (2018). 
 12. This reality has required state legislatures to pass statutes in order to protect 
citizens’ privacy. For example, “Florida law exempts [body-worn camera] video from 
release if it is from inside a home, a hospital, the scene of a ‘medical emergency’, or 
somewhere the individual recorded has ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy.’” BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, POLICE BODY CAMERA POLICES, RETENTION AND RELEASE 6 
(2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Retention_and_Release.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6XXY-KFCK]; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §	119.071(2)(l)(2) (West, 
Westlaw through chapters from the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of 25th Leg. in effect through 
Apr. 6, 2018). Similarly, 
Washington law exempts video from public release if it depicts: a medical facility 
or patient, the interior of a place of residence, an “intimate image,” a minor, a 
dead body, the identity of a victim or witness of sexual assault or domestic 
violence (unless the subject requests release), or the location of a domestic 
violence program. 
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during limited-purpose incursions, such as public-safety or 
administrative searches, created without a warrant and on less than 
probable cause. 
Given their new scope, it is fair to ask: When and how do we turn 
the cameras on? The technology permits us to choose a range of 
options. The camera may be always on or sometimes on. If the 
camera is only sometimes on it can either be presumptively on, with 
circumstances in which it is turned off—either at the officer’s 
discretion or under dispatch control—or presumptively off but turned 
on for certain kinds of encounters—again, either at the officer’s 
discretion or under dispatch control. Each of these choices comes 
with advantages and disadvantages.13 The different kinds of video 
platforms also may raise different questions because we are recording 
different physical spaces, with different privacy interests. Let us 
briefly consider each in turn. 
A. Always on 
First, the camera might always be on, so long as the officer is on 
duty. The always-on option creates the fewest opportunities for 
manipulation by the officer. It means that the video will reflect the 
full range of the encounters in which the officer engages. It also raises 
the highest risk for privacy and implicates the privacy of the public as 
well as the privacy of the officers. Under this system fleeting 
conversations14 between officers and citizens will now be recorded. 
 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra, at 7. 
 13. Enforcing the policies raises another set of issues altogether. Internal discipline or 
evidentiary presumptions are among the possible sanctions. See generally, e.g., Mary D. 
Fan, Missing Body Camera Videos: Evidentiary Fairness Beyond Blame, 52 GA. L. REV. 57 
(2017) (discussing the widespread detection and enforcement gaps regarding failures to 
record as policy requires). 
 14. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), Justice Harlan dissented to a Fourth 
Amendment rule permitting recording by undercover officers or their agents without a 
warrant:  
Authority is hardly needed to support the proposition that words would be 
measured a good deal more carefully and communication inhibited if one 
suspected his conversations were being transmitted and transcribed. Were third-
party bugging a prevalent practice, it might well smother that spontaneity—
reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant discourse—that 
liberates daily life. Much off-hand exchange is easily forgotten and one may count 
on the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the very fact of a limited audience, 
and the likelihood that the listener will either overlook or forget what is said, as 
well as the listener’s inability to reformulate a conversation without having to 
contend with a documented record. All these values are sacrificed by a rule of law 
that permits official monitoring of private discourse limited only by the need to 
locate a willing assistant.  
96 N.C. L. REV. 1237 (2018) 
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With the cameras always on, in-person anonymous tips would no 
longer exist. Domestic violence victims could expect their spouse and 
their spouse’s counsel to review any statement made to the police. It 
follows that requests for protection would predictably be converted 
into evidence for the prosecution, which some advocates say might 
reduce reporting and increase the danger to victims. 
The always-on model also materially alters the privacy balance 
for the officers themselves. Police officers who could speak to other 
officers, spouses, or friends while on duty will alter their behavior to 
reflect the constant monitoring.15 Pervasive recording of all of the 
officers’ intimate moments is already being challenged by some 
departments as a material change in working conditions, opening 
police union contracts to renegotiation.16 Officers may have rights 
under labor-law provisions or contracts that are affected by the 
cameras.17 
B. Sometimes on 
Another framework calls for the camera to only sometimes be 
on—either presumptively on or presumptively off. Under this model, 
the discretion regarding when the camera will be turned off or on can 
rest either with the officer or headquarters. The decision of where the 
discretion should lie and the determination of what is sufficient 
 
Id. at 788–89 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 15. Recognizing this, the Police Executive Research Forum (“PERF”) policy would 
prohibit recording of officers by officers in some settings. 
Agencies should prohibit recording other agency personnel during routine, non-
enforcement-related activities unless recording is required by a court order or is 
authorized as part of an administrative or criminal investigation.  
Under this policy, for example, officers may not record their partner while they 
are patrolling in their vehicle (unless they are responding to a call for service), are 
having lunch at their desks, are on breaks, are in the locker room, etc.  
Rationale: This policy supports officer privacy and ensures officers feel safe to 
engage in routine, informal, non-law enforcement-related conversations with their 
colleagues. 
MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 42. 
 16. See, e.g., Steve Miletich, SPD Body Cameras are Stalled over Contract Talks, 
SEATTLE TIMES (June 22, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/spd-
body-cameras-are-stalled-over-contract-talks/ [http://perma.cc/9WZY-RHL9]; see also 
Paige Browning, Seattle Police Union Challenges New Body Camera Requirement, KUOW 
(July 25, 2017), http://kuow.org/post/seattle-police-union-challenges-new-body-camera-
requirement [http://perma.cc/AJN7-XBLA]. 
 17. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742–44 (1962) (holding unilateral change in 
conditions of employment under negotiation violates the National Labor Relations Act). 
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warning to notify a citizen that she is being recorded create their own 
quandaries. 
1.  Officer-controlled 
The first option is to allow an officer to record only during some 
activities. Some draft policies, such those from the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the Police Executive Research 
Forum (“PERF”), assume that the officer will be able to control the 
camera.18 PERF contemplates “[a]s a general recording policy, 
officers should be required to activate their body-worn cameras when 
responding to all calls for service and during all law enforcement-
related encounters and activities that occur while the officer is on 
duty.”19 There is, however, a downside to officer-controlled policies. 
If the officer can turn the camera off for legitimate reasons, he may 
turn it off for illegitimate reasons. Abusive conduct will be possible. 
2.  Headquarters-controlled 
Technology makes it possible for the cameras to be turned on 
and off only with the permission of a central office.20 A watch 
commander, shift sergeant, or other trained individual would decide 
which calls for service would be recorded and under what 
circumstances the camera would be turned off. Officers going on meal 
or bathroom breaks, or requesting private encounters with witnesses 
or victims, for example, would radio in and request that the camera 
be turned off. At the end of the justified non-recording period, the 
camera would be restored. While this would mitigate some of the 
concerns that are raised by the always-on model, this policy is more 
labor-intensive, requires a degree of monitoring that might be cost-
prohibitive, and may adversely affect morale. 
Technology also exists for certain automatic activations. Taser 
makes it possible to link its cameras to its eponymous electric shock 
 
 18. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 40; see also A MODEL ACT FOR REGULATING 
THE USE OF BODY CAMERAS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT §	1 (AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION 
2018), https://www.aclu.org/other/model-act-regulating-use-wearable-body-cameras-law-
enforcement [http://perma.cc/V2LJ-5XHW]. 
 19. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 40. 
 20. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, DHS S&T Awards $442K to 
Hitron Technologies Inc. to Develop Auto-Activated Body-Worn Cameras for First 
Responders (June 30, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2016/06/30
/news-release-st-awards-442k-auto-activated-body-worn-cameras [http://perma.cc/C3MJ-
NHNF]. 
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device.21 Other manufacturers have linked their cameras to a holster-
mounted trigger that automatically activates the camera when a 
weapon is removed.22 By removing the human element from these 
high-stress situations, the camera is more likely to be deployed when 
needed. The downside of adding more technology is increased 
expense for acquisition, training, and maintenance. 
C. Additional Concerns 
1.  Warnings that Recording is Taking Place 
Another contested issue is the extent to which police officers 
should warn citizens that they are being recorded. For good or ill, 
people might act differently if they know they are being recorded.23 In 
fact, this is one of the widely offered justifications for deploying 
cameras in the first place.24 Policies should cover who to warn about 
ongoing recording and when. In some jurisdictions wiretap statutes,25 
 
 21. Michael Fleeman, L.A. Police to Get Tasers that Activate Body Cameras When 
Used, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2015, 6:40PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-california-
tasers/l-a-police-to-get-tasers-that-activate-body-cameras-when-used-idUSKBN0KF26B20150106 
[https://perma.cc/HY56-N3NH]. 
 22. E.g., Laura Diaz-Zuniga, New Bodycams Start Recording with the Draw of a Gun, 
CNN (July 21, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/21/us/bodycams-activate-automatically
/index.html [http://perma.cc/825S-2YE7]. 
 23. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 40. (“The mere knowledge that one is being 
recorded can help promote civility during police-citizen encounters. Police executives 
report that cameras improve both officer professionalism and the public’s behavior, an 
observation that is supported by evaluations of body-worn camera programs.”). 
 24. See, e.g., DAVID YOKUM, ANITA RAVISHANKAR & ALEXANDER COPPOCK, 
EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS: A RANDOMIZED 
CONTROLLED TRIAL 1–2 (2017). 
 25. Two-party consent states include California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington. CAL. PENAL CODE §	632(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2018 Reg. 
Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §	52-570d(a) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Supp. to the 
Gen. Stat. of Conn.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §	2402(c)(4) (West, Westlaw through 81 
Laws 2018, Chs. 200–216); FLA. STAT. ANN. §	934.03(2)(d) (West, Westlaw through 
chapters from the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 25th Leg. in effect through Apr. 6, 2018); 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-582 of the 2018 
Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §	10-402(c)(3) (West, Westlaw through 
Chs. 1 to 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 64, 65, 69, 79 & 80 of the 2018 Reg. Sess. of 
the Gen. Assemb.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §	99(B)(4) (West, Westlaw through 
Ch. 62 of the 2018 2nd Annual Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. §	45-8-213(1)(c) (West, Westlaw 
through the 2017 Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §	570-A:2(I) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 7 
of the 2018 Reg. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §	165.540(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 
2017 Reg. Sess. legislation effective through Jan. 1, 2018); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. §	5704(2)(iv) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Act 11); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §	9.73.030(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Chs. 1 to 3, 48, 81, 89, 92, 94, 102, 131 & 133 
of the 2018 Reg. Sess.).  
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written before the advent of police cameras, might be read to require 
a warning once the officer enters certain places because the recording 
takes place without the judicial or administrative warrants 
contemplated by statute. 
Warning policies might change depending on the situation. 
Police-citizen encounters can be voluntary or involuntary. We can 
expect voluntary encounters with ordinary citizens, victims, witnesses, 
and confidential informants. In contrast, encounters with suspects, 
accused individuals, and arrestees might be voluntary or involuntary. 
The expectations and presumptions for turning the cameras on or off 
might differ by class of person and type of encounter. So too might 
the expectations about warning the participants in the conversation 
that they are being recorded. Officers talking to a suspect might be 
required to leave the cameras on. Voluntary encounters with 
witnesses or other non-suspects, on the other hand, might include a 
presumptive warning that the subject is being recorded and require 
the officer offer to turn the camera off if the subject objects to the 
recording.26 In these sorts of cases, some departments require that the 
 
  Of these states, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have specifically exempted 
police body-worn video. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §	52-570d(b)(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, §	2402(c)(5); FLA. STAT. ANN. §	934.03(2)(c); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2(b); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §	10-402(c)(4); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 
§	99(B)(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §	570-A:2(II)(b)–(c); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§	165.540(5)(b); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §	5704(2). 
 26. For example, the PERF draft policy reads as follows: 
Officers should be required to inform subjects when they are being recorded 
unless doing so would be unsafe, impractical, or impossible. Some states have two-
party consent laws that require a person making a recording to obtain the consent 
of the person or persons being recorded. In this case, officers must obtain consent 
unless the law provides an exception for police recordings. Most states have one-
party consent policies, which allow officers to make recordings without obtaining 
consent. 
PERF recommends that police in all states inform subjects that they are being 
recorded, aside from the exceptions stated already. This policy does not mean that 
officers in one-party consent states must obtain consent prior to recording; rather, 
they must inform subjects when the camera is running. 
Rationale: The mere knowledge that one is being recorded can help promote 
civility during police-citizen encounters. Police executives report that cameras 
improve both officer professionalism and the public’s behavior, an observation 
that is supported by evaluations of body-worn camera programs. 
MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 40. 
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officer state on the recording the reasons why the recording is being 
stopped before deactivating the camera.27 
2.  Encoding 
Another concern in the creation of large amounts of police-
generated digital video is the potential for big-data abuses.28 Digital 
video recording devices can capture a great deal of information in 
addition to moving pictures and sound. Embedded GPS devices, 
compasses, and timers can tell us where the officer was and when 
precisely the recording was made.29 The downloaded video can be 
linked or encoded to refer to computerized or recorded dispatch 
information, video from other officers’ devices, and case reports. 
Suspect information, including prior arrest records, other recordings, 
gang affiliations, and intelligence assessments of various kinds can be 
linked across databases in comprehensive assessment systems. The 
encoded information might be shared across departments with 
prosecutors’ offices, with state or federal level agencies, and with 
other third parties or researchers. Computerized tools for these 
purposes are expanding rapidly. 
II.  STORAGE 
Deciding where and how the police-generated digital video will 
be stored and for how long raises the second important set of 
questions for departments adopting video systems.30 Digital data is 
storage intensive, especially at higher resolutions31 (and high 
 
 27. E.g., SPOKANE POLICE DEP’T, POLICY §	703.4(D)(1)(a) (2017), 
https://static.spokanecity.org/documents/police/accountability/bodycamera/spd-body-camera
-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGY2-4AZN]. 
 28. See Peter Swire & Jesse Woo, Privacy and Cybersecurity Lessons at the 
Intersection of the Internet of Things and Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 
1475, 1485–87 (2018). See generally Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2013) (discussing the threats big data poses to those whom it 
overlooks). 
 29. See Alexandra Mateescu, Alex Rosenblat & danah boyd, Police Body-Worn 
Cameras 6–7 (Data & Soc’y Research Inst., Working Paper, Feb. 2015), 
https://www.datasociety.net/pubs/dcr/PoliceBodyWornCameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LW4-
PUZK]. 
 30. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 1 (“In order for video to be 
used or released, it has to be preserved. Storage space for video is very expensive, 
however, and privacy and security concerns crop up with a large database of videos. The 
length of time potential evidence in a court case must be preserved is governed by state 
law. Retention time for all other video is generally a matter of police policy.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Lucas Mearian, As Police Move to Adopt Body Cams, Storage Costs Set 
to Skyrocket, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.computerworld.com/article
96 N.C. L. REV. 1237 (2018) 
1246 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
resolution may be critical for investigative and forensic reasons).32 
Like any data-intensive government project, database managers will 
have to answer a host of technical questions, such as deciding if the 
video will live in the cloud or on proprietary servers, managing the 
ongoing costs as storage needs mount, and determining the extent to 
which backups and encryption can solve durability and security 
concerns.33 
For police and public records, however, one of the most 
important issues is deciding which videos will be stored and for how 
long. Storing thousands of hours of video will be expensive.34 Many 
departments and policies divide video into two categories—
evidentiary video and non-evidentiary video—and follow different 
protocols for each category.35 Uploading unaltered files in a way that 
maintains video integrity and preserves the chain of custody will be 
one of the best ways to address future evidentiary questions. Case 
needs will help define storage periods for evidentiary video, which 
might last decades depending on appellate schedules and exhaustion. 
Non-evidentiary video might be kept for significantly shorter 
periods.36 Currently, departments’ presumptive storage times vary 
widely. The London police will automatically delete video after 
thirty-one days unless it has evidentiary value.37 Chicago and Dallas 
 
/2979627/cloud-storage/as-police-move-to-adopt-body-cams-storage-costs-set-to-skyrocket.html 
[http://perma.cc/MJ8E-T75F]. 
 32. David K. Bakardjiev, Comment, Officer Body-Worn Cameras—Capturing 
Objective Evidence with Quality Technology and Focused Policies, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 79, 
103 (2015). 
 33. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 15 (“Among police executives interviewed by 
PERF, security, reliability, cost, and technical capacity were the primary factors cited for 
choosing a particular method for storing video files from body-worn cameras. Among the 
more than 40 departments that PERF consulted, all stored body-worn camera video on an 
in-house server (managed internally) or an online cloud database (managed by a third-
party vendor).”). 
 34. See Mearian, supra note 31. 
 35. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 1. 
 36. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 17. (“Many police executives express a 
preference for shorter retention times for non-evidentiary video. Shorter retention periods 
not only address privacy concerns but also reduce the costs associated with data storage. 
On the other hand, police executives noted that they must keep videos long enough to 
demonstrate transparency and to have footage of an encounter in case a complaint arises 
about an officer’s actions. For example, departments in Rialto, Fort Collins, Albuquerque, 
Daytona Beach, and Toronto base retention times in part on how long it generally takes 
for complaints to be filed.”). For a collection of policies, see BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
supra note 12, at 2–9. 
 37. See Press Release, Metro. Police, supra note 8. 
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policies call for deletion after ninety days.38 The policies in New 
Orleans and Oakland specify two years.39 
The courts have yet to contribute in any significant way on when 
video might have to be kept for reasons outside of ordinary policy. 
For example, one underexplored wild card in this area is the need to 
search for exculpatory information in cases where the defendant 
claims alibi or mistaken identity. If it is possible that the defendant 
might appear in a different officer’s video stream, Brady v. 
Maryland40 and its progeny might create a constitutional duty to 
preserve potential exculpatory evidence that trumps shorter periods 
in departmental policy.41 
Cost and logistical concerns for digital video storage may vary 
significantly, depending on how departments choose to set up their 
databases. Databases might be fully shared amongst some agencies, 
some videos (or portions thereof) might be shared on a case-by-case 
basis, or video might be siloed.42 Some departments upload videos to 
departmental websites, YouTube, or department social media 
accounts such as Facebook.43 
III.  ACCESS 
The next critical phase once the data has been created, tagged, 
and stored is accessing it for examination and determining suitability 
for potential public use.44 Groups that may access this data include 
police, attorneys in criminal cases, and other third parties. 
 
 38. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 2–3. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 41. Id. at 87 (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”). 
 42. See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 1 (“Many of the police 
departments that use BWCs participate in fusion centers, joint information-sharing efforts 
between local, state, and federal government and the private sector. These fusion centers 
pull in copious data that is tenuously related to crime or terrorism and generally retain it 
for long periods of time, and have been castigated as endangering citizens’ civil liberties 
with little counterterrorism value to show for it.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Kerisha Harris, Tampa Police Share Body Camera Footage on Facebook, 
NBC 6 SOUTH FLA. (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Tampa-Police-
Share-Body-Camera-Footage-on-Facebook-370253721.html [http://perma.cc/Z39S-
GDAD]. See generally Mary Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy 
Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2016) (collecting and examining policies on release).  
 44. See infra Part IV (discussing redaction and public use). 
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A. Access for Police 
Interested groups might be granted access to the data under 
different predefined conditions. Police departments might have 
internal policies about who within the agency can access the video 
once it is created.45 For example, an officer might presumptively have 
access to the video created by his own camera for purposes of writing 
ordinary reports but may lose access in cases where officer conduct or 
discipline is likely to become an issue.46 On the one hand, access may 
refresh the officer’s recollection and result in more accurate reports. 
On the other, the officer’s memory of events may be distorted by the 
video or his report may be tailored to tell a story that matches what 
can be seen on the video, to the detriment of possible disciplinary 
proceedings. Defense counsel might also prefer if the officer had to 
write and testify unaided because of the possibility that a difference 
between the video and the officer’s testimony would create 
impeachment material. Departmental supervisors might have routine 
access for personnel management or training purposes or access only 
under certain conditions.47 
 
 45. See, e.g., LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, 5/210.01: BODY WORN CAMERAS, 
http://ipicd.com/ceer/files/LVMPD%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [http://perma.cc/D8GV-ZXL2] 
(establishing when and how officers, supervisors, and other members of the LVMPD may 
access video recordings). 
 46. See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 29. The report surveyed police 
executives on this issue and found the following: 
Given the impact that body-worn cameras can have in criminal and administrative 
proceedings, there is some question as to whether officers should be allowed to 
review camera footage prior to making a statement about an incident in which 
they were involved. According to many police executives, the primary benefit to 
officer review is that it allows officers to recall events more clearly, which helps get 
to the truth of what really happened. Some police executives, on the other hand, 
said that it is better for an officer’s statement to reflect what he or she perceived 
during the event, rather than what the camera footage revealed. The majority of 
police executives consulted by PERF are in favor of allowing officers to review 
body-worn camera footage prior to making a statement about an incident in which 
they were involved. They believe that this approach provides the best evidence of 
what actually took place. PERF agrees with this position. 
Id. Fierce differences arose in Los Angeles, California over whether officers should be 
allowed to review their video first. See Kate Mather, Divided Police Commission Approves 
Rules for LAPD Body Cameras, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local
/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-body-cameras-rules-20150427-story.html [http://perma.cc/5TX3-
WCA3]. 
 47. See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 25. 
Most agencies permit supervisors to review videos so they can investigate a 
specific incident or complaint, identify videos for training purposes, ensure the 
system is working, and monitor overall compliance with the camera program. 
However, there is some debate over whether supervisors should also periodically 
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Since a second major purpose of digital video is public 
accountability, local political bodies such as town councils, county 
commissions, police commissions, spokespeople, or other non-law-
enforcement government employees might also need to access the 
video in certain cases. These groups might be considered to be within 
the police-management chain of command for access purposes. 
B. Access for Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys 
In criminal prosecutions prosecutors’ offices also will routinely 
need to access recordings made by police. The access might be direct 
or through departmental intermediaries.48 Some prosecutors will 
prefer the ability to judge the relevance and utility of video for 
themselves.49 Others might prefer to have the agencies comb through 
the video to produce the relevant material.50 A benefit to having 
limited access is that it may also limit claims of tampering and 
preserve the chain of custody. There are many ways to structure such 
a policy. For example, a prosecutor’s office might permit access to 
certified digital copies of evidentiary recordings in all charged cases, 
including videos that might contain exculpatory information, and give 
its prosecutors the authority to order database searches in compliance 
with court orders. Likewise, defense counsel, defendants, and 
innocence and accountability organizations should also have access as 
appropriate under discovery rules and court orders.51 To further 
 
and randomly review videos to monitor officer performance. Some agencies allow 
periodic monitoring to help proactively identify problems and hold officers 
accountable for their performance. Other agencies permit periodic monitoring 
only in certain circumstances, such as when an officer is still in a probationary 
period or after an officer has received a certain number of complaints. Some 
agencies prohibit random monitoring altogether because they believe doing so is 
unnecessary if supervisors conduct reviews when an incident occurs. 
Id. 
 48. See LINDA MIROLA ET AL., BODY WORN CAMERAS AND THE COURTS: A 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE PROSECUTORS 17–20 (2016), http://cebcp.org/wp-
content/technology/BWCProsecutors.pdf [http://perma.cc/U5T9-7SRB]. 
 49. See id. at 6. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §	1054.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2018 Reg. 
Sess.). California law states that: 
The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney all 
of the following materials and information, if it is in the possession of the 
prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession 
of the investigating agencies: 
(a) The names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses 
at trial. 
(b) Statements of all defendants. 
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complicate matters, sometimes there will be specialized state law that 
treats access to body-camera video differently from other data.52 
C. Access for Non-Criminal Justice Actors 
Direct access to the databases is more politically complicated 
once the requests expand beyond the core categories of participants 
in the criminal justice system. We can reasonably expect access 
requests from uncharged recorded citizens, local and state political 
bodies, members of the news media, researchers, and ordinary 
members of the public. The further afield the requesters are, some 
commentators believe, the more attenuated the need for direct access 
and the more significant privacy concerns become.53 
It might be possible to limit direct access to certain tags, certain 
terms such as time, date and place, or—as the software gets more 
sophisticated—facial recognition and other targeted queries. The 
more the access is curated, the less responsive the department will 
seem to be to citizen oversight. 
 
(c) All relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of 
the offenses charged.	.	.	. 
(f) Relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the 
statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial, including 
any reports or statements of experts made in conjunction with the case, including 
the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or 
comparisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the trial. 
Id. 
 52. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §	132-1.4A (2017). The release of body-camera video is 
covered solely by this section of the General Statutes. §	132-1.4A(c). Ordinarily, disclosure 
is very limited, and a court order is required to overturn any decision for non-disclosure by 
an agency. §	132-1.4A(e). However, there is a law-enforcement exception: 
(h) Release of Recordings; Law Enforcement Purposes. — Notwithstanding the 
requirements of subsections (c), (f), and (g) of this section, a custodial law 
enforcement agency shall disclose or release a recording to a district attorney (i) 
for review of potential criminal charges, (ii) in order to comply with discovery 
requirements in a criminal prosecution, (iii) for use in criminal proceedings in 
district court, or (iv) any other law enforcement purpose, and may disclose or 
release a recording for any of the following purposes: 
(1) For law enforcement training purposes. 
(2) Within the custodial law enforcement agency for any administrative, training, 
or law enforcement purpose. 
(3) To another law enforcement agency for law enforcement purposes. 
§	132-1.4A(h). 
 53. See Chris Pagliarella, Comment, Police Body-Worn Camera Footage: A Question 
of Access, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 533, 541–42 (2016). 
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IV.  REDACTION 
What gets released, and in what form, depends largely on the 
audience to which the video is being released. Unless the department 
makes the highly unlikely choice to release all video, someone will 
have to serve as a gatekeeper and redact the video in keeping with 
some protocol.54 
We can predict a range of cross-cutting interests that would 
result in very different redaction polices and interpretations thereof. 
The core tradeoff will be between the privacy of the individuals 
recorded and the police officers involved, on the one hand, and public 
oversight on the other. Police may fear that routine release outside 
law enforcement circles will make victims and cooperating witnesses 
less likely to come forward. If there is no confidentiality, by definition 
there can be no confidential informants.55 Prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and judges might be concerned about contaminating jury 
and witness pools and about retaining the evidentiary value of the 
recordings.56 Members of the media will want unfettered access to 
video of any high-salience event as soon in the news cycle as possible, 
so they can exercise their own news judgment.57 Victims and witnesses 
may want the video released, or they may want it kept secret because 
 
 54. See Fan, supra note 43, at 433–34 (2016) (discussing the costs and challenges of 
redaction of body-worn camera video before disclosure). 
 55. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 19–20. The report noted: 
At the PERF conference, a number of participants expressed concern that 
excessive recording with body-worn cameras may damage the relationships 
officers have developed with the community and hinder the openness of their 
community policing interactions. Some police executives fear, for example, that 
people will be less likely to come forward to share information if they know their 
conversation is going to be recorded, particularly in high-crime neighborhoods 
where residents might be subject to retaliation if they are seen as cooperating with 
police. 
Id. 
 56. See David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 407, 412–13 (2013) (discussing the capacity of juries to disregard known 
information on the process of formulating their verdicts). See generally WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE ET. AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1069–1101 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the 
problem of prejudicial pretrial publicity and methods to control it).  
 57. See, e.g., REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, TESTIMONY OF 
KATIE TOWNSEND ON BEHALF OF THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS ON THE METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT’S BODY-WORN CAMERA 
PROGRAM 4 (2015), https://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/2015-05-07-comments-on-dc-
police-bodycam.pdf [http://perma.cc/U9WQ-QR48] (“[I]t is only when the public has 
access to BWC video that the stated objectives of the BWC program—increased 
transparency, accountability, and trust between law enforcement and the community—can 
be achieved.”). 
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they fear reputational harm or retaliation. Accused persons might 
want the video freely available because they believe it proves their 
innocence, or they may want it suppressed because they fear that it 
establishes their guilt. Uncharged arrestees might seek access to 
discipline the police, or they may seek suppression to preserve their 
reputation. Individuals might want video of an interaction outside 
their home released while opposing the release of video that reveals 
private details of the inside of their homes. Juvenile recording statutes 
in many jurisdictions add an additional layer of complexity over all of 
these decisions.58 
In many states body-worn video fits the definition of a public 
record and is subject to the state version of a freedom of information 
act.59 Many such acts have provisions that define what will be 
produced and when.60 Some states have categorically exempted body-
camera footage altogether.61 Others have attempted to balance 
privacy concerns and public access.62 For instance, some states have 
limited access to videos created inside homes and other private 
spaces, or “place[s] that a reasonable person would expect to be 
private.”63 Others define body-camera footage as a police 
investigative record and restrict access according to preexisting 
protocols.64 Many states or agencies also include cost-shifting 
provisions, which require the requesters to pay for the cost of the 
request, sometimes once it exceeds a certain threshold.65 Reviewing 
 
 58. See Tamryn J. Etten & Robert F. Petrone, Sharing Data and Information in 
Juvenile Justice: Legal, Ethical, and Practical Considerations, 45 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 65, 66–
67 (1994). 
 59. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §	2-532(c)(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through Apr. 9, 2018). 
 60. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §	132-1.4A(c)–(d) (2017). 
 61. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 43, at 413–14 (discussing, along with other states, North 
Carolina and South Carolina’s strict anti-disclosure statutes); see also S.C. CODE ANN. 
§	23-1-240(G)(1) (2016). 
 62. See, e.g., Kelly Swanson, Advocates Push Back Against FOIA Exemptions for 
Bodycam Footage, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (June 9, 2015), 
https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news/advocates-push-back-against-foia-
exemptions-bodycam-footage [http://perma.cc/S53U-DG24] (“Florida Senate Bill 248. 
includes restrictions that make body-camera footage confidential if it is recorded within 
the interior of a private residence, within the interior of a facility that offers health care, 
mental health care, or social services or in a place that a reasonable person would expect 
to be private.”). 
 63. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §	119.071(2)(l)(2)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2018 
Second Reg. Sess.). 
 64. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-254 (West, Westlaw through fourth Special Sess. 
of the 30th Leg.). 
 65. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §	40.25.110(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 First 
Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §	10003(m) (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §	119.07(4).  
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and redacting video is time-consuming and expensive. In some cases 
requesters have been charged tens of thousands of dollars for the cost 
of preparing responsive video.66 
V.  USE 
If there was a single answer to why we deploy body cameras, 
some of the policy choices would be simplified. But there are multiple 
answers to the question.67 Body-worn video may ultimately be used as 
evidence in criminal and civil trials68 and in disciplinary proceedings 
related to use-of-force complaints.69 It can be used by courts to 
determine compliance with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.70 It 
can be used internally by police departments for training and 
management and by outside oversight bodies for the same purposes.71 
It can be used by the press and the public to show the good and bad 
 
 66. See Swanson, supra note 62 (discussing an $18,000 bill charged to the ACLU by 
the City of Sarasota when the ACLU made a FOIA request for body cam video; the case 
ultimately settled). 
 67. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at vii.  
Law enforcement agencies are using body-worn cameras in various ways: to 
improve evidence collection, to strengthen officer performance and accountability, 
to enhance agency transparency, to document encounters between police and the 
public, and to investigate and resolve complaints and officer-involved incidents. 
Although body-worn cameras can offer many benefits, they also raise serious 
questions about how technology is changing the relationship between police and 
the community. Body-worn cameras not only create concerns about the public’s 
privacy rights but also can affect how officers relate to people in the community, 
the community’s perception of the police, and expectations about how police 
agencies should share information with the public. 
Id. 
 68. See Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 900–02 (2016); see also JOEL M. SCHUMM, POLICING BODY 
CAMERAS: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO SAFEGUARD THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 
16 (2017), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/BWC-NACDL-March2017.pdf [http://perma.cc
/X87U-AK2D]. 
 69. See OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS, GOV’T OF THE D.C. POLICE COMPLAINTS 
BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 19–20 (2017), https://policecomplaints.dc.gov/sites
/default/files/dc/sites/office%20of%20police%20complaints/publication/attachments/OfficeofPolice
Complaints_AR17.pdf [http://perma.cc/8T7F-GWW3]. 
 70. See David A. Harris, Picture This: Body Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) As 
Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 
359–60 (2010); see also Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 55 (2016) 
(“Prof. Paul Cassell has suggested that mandatory videotaping could substitute for 
Miranda rules, since it would provide adequate protection against false confessions ‘by 
allowing judges and juries to see when police have led an innocent person to admit to a 
crime he did not commit.’” (citation omitted)). 
 71. See Developments in the Law—Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1794, 1802–03 (2015).  
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of police actions.72 Heroic first responders might be praised and police 
brutality exposed.73 
At trial, using body-camera video as evidence may require 
meeting all of the demands of chain of custody unless it is being used 
as an adjunct to the testimony of eyewitnesses on the scene.74 
Confrontation Clause requirements may limit the use of recordings.75 
Hearsay limitations might require special instructions or redaction.76 
Fairness requirements might require that all of the video from a 
situation be produced to place selected portions on context.77 
 
 72. See, e.g., Miguel Marquez, Body Camera Video Allegedly Shows Baltimore Cop 
Planting Evidence, CNN (July 20, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/20/us/baltimore-cop-
allegedly-planting-evidence/index.html [http://perma.cc/CY47-P8R3]; see also Corky 
Siemaszko, Body Cameras Win Converts Among Police Officers on the Beat, NBC NEWS 
(May 8, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/body-cameras-win-converts-
among-police-officers-beat-n566311 [http://perma.cc/7BJ8-287R]. 
 73. See, e.g., MAYOR STEPHANIE RAWLINGS-BLAKE’S WORKING GRP. ON THE USE 
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 41 
(2015), http://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/Body%20Camera%20Working
%20Group%20Recommendations.pdf [http://perma.cc/92CV-7MGW] (“After extensive 
review of the issues posed by the possible use and implementation of body-worn cameras 
by the BPD, the Working Group concludes that body-worn cameras may provide 
additional transparency which, in turn, could potentially result in fewer complaints of 
misconduct, less costs associated with such complaints and greater accountability of BPD 
to the citizens it serves. Furthermore, prosecutions may be increased along with the 
success rate of same. The use of a body-worn camera program locally could document law 
enforcement interaction with the public by providing recorded evidence of actions, 
conditions and statements that may be used for court proceedings, internal review, or 
review by the public through formal request. Likewise, such documentation could 
facilitate and enhance officer and supervisor training.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Jeff Welty, One Case, Two Ways of Authenticating Video, UNC SCH. OF 
GOV’T: N.C. CRIMINAL LAW (June 27, 2016), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/one-case-
two-ways-authenticating-video/ [http://perma.cc/T47D-E8SZ]. 
 75. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (holding that a spouse’s 
tape-recorded testimony was excluded because the petitioner “had no opportunity to 
cross-examine [his wife]” and all testimonial statements require confrontation). Using this 
rule in the context of body-camera video, a judge would have to consider whether or not 
statements made by an unavailable witness to a police officer constituted testimonial 
statements that require Confrontation Clause protections. 
 76. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(2). For example, an eyewitness making a statement on-
camera might repeat hearsay to the officer when describing the events that are the subject 
of the litigation. See id.  
 77. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 106. This rule, titled Remainder of or Related Writings or 
Recorded Statements, can allow a party to require the introduction of the remainder of a 
writing or a recording (or other writings or recordings) if fairness requires that this other 
portion or writing be considered with the one originally introduced. Id. In the body-worn 
camera context, an adverse party may require a party who wishes to introduce a video to 
introduce the video in its entirety for fairness or context. See also Bakardjiev, supra note 
32, at 99 (discussing what editing requirements may be imposed by Federal Rules of 
Evidence 401 and 403, and determining that these rules may require redaction in some 
situations). 
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Conversely, First Amendment limits may require the 
government to accept incomplete, out-of-context, and even deceptive 
editing of video once it has been turned over to the press or the 
public.78 
Police-generated digital video sits at the intersection of at least 
ten areas of law and policy: police management, administrative law, 
privacy law, public records law, wiretap/recording laws, Fourth 
Amendment law, labor law, First Amendment law, tort law, and the 
emerging field of big data. Properly drafting a policy requires legal as 
well as political skill. By bringing together researchers from many 
disciplines, any framework that a state or agency develops must 
ensure that the tradeoffs of incommensurables that any policy 
necessarily entails will take place after a full public discussion and will 
be the product of choice, not inattention. 
Body-camera policies are now being made at a number of levels, 
sometimes with extensive participation from all interested parties, but 
oftentimes not. Many of the early pilot projects that were used as 
starting points for follow-on policies were very localized. Police 
departments wrote the policy with a strong focus on the needs of law 
enforcement. Local politicians who were directly responsible for 
department budgets and personnel decisions had the most direct 
impact on department policy. 
Municipal law and state law, taken together, cover much of the 
legal framework. Preexisting policies such as the Freedom of 
Information Act may subsume the videos into old categories, such as 
investigative reports or undifferentiated public records. Recording 
may be governed by wiretap statutes written at a time when officers 
were not expected to be wearing recording devices at all times. Police 
and prosecutors have significant influence on many state legislatures. 
Interest groups such as the ACLU, the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Attorneys, the Reporters Committee on the 
Freedom of the Press, or state-level press-lobbying organizations will 
have varying degrees of influence. 
As policy is being crafted, and the tradeoffs are being made, a 
multitude of viewpoints should have a seat at the table. Among those 
included should be thoughtful individuals serving as representatives 
 
 78. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled 
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 977 (2009). Corbin notes that “[t]he right against 
compelled speech is firmly established in First Amendment jurisprudence: ‘[F]reedom of 
thought protected by the First Amendment .	.	. includes both the right to speak freely and 
the right to refrain from speaking at all.’” Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 
714 (1977)).  
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of the police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, victims/witnesses’ rights 
representatives, civil rights representatives, civil liberties 
representatives, taxpayer representatives, and the press. The drafters 
should consider a variety of lenses to test the policy and expect 
answers to the big questions to cut in different directions.79 They 
might ask how each decision being made promotes or hinders the 
following values: efficient and equitable law enforcement, privacy, 
civil rights, civil liberties, free speech and association, safety and 
security of the police and of the policed, transparency and oversight, 
and police management. Ultimately, they should be asking: Does the 
policy advance the goals of government intelligence regarding crime, 
while protecting us from living in a police state? 
CONCLUSION 
Is it possible for any policy to simultaneously advance all of the 
possible goals one could name as reasons for deploying body-worn 
video systems? It is not. But the Articles in this Symposium Issue, 
taken together, offer a sophisticated set of analytical tools to 
policymakers as they make their decisions. Policymakers should seek 
to answer the questions that will inevitably arise as one tracks the life 
cycle of the video: creation, storage, access, redaction, and use. The 
tradeoffs should be conscious and considered as well as legally 
sophisticated. A wide range of voices should be invited to the table, 
and efforts should be made to harmonize the wide range of 
preexisting policies that will impact the use of digital video as 
evidence. 
 
 79. For an example of these different policies, see THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 
ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS (3.04 ed. 
2017), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/pdfs/LCCHR%20and%20Upturn%20-%20BWC
%20Scorecard%20v.3.04.pdf [http://perma.cc/JTQ4-GB5M]. This report has been signed 
onto by a wide range of civil rights and civil liberties organizations—including, inter alia, 
the ACLU, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the 
NAACP, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the National Council of 
La Raza—and grades departmental policies on eight criteria: “whether the department”: 
(1) “Makes the Department Policy Publicly and Readily Available,” (2) “Limits Officer 
Discretion on When to Record,” (3) “Addresses Personal Privacy Concerns,” (4) 
“Prohibits Officer Pre-Report Viewing,” (5) “Limits Retention of Footage,” (6) “Protects 
Footage Against Tampering and Misuse,” (7) “Makes Footage Available to Individuals 
Filing Complaints,” and (8) “Limits the Use of Biometric Technologies.” Id. 
